Jointness

Yesterday for dinner I ate in the DFAC which is slightly out of the ordinary, but football was on the TV so I decided against taking carry-out to my room. The best seat I could get was next to two Air Force majors. One of them noticed that my uniform said Navy so we started chatting. They were both impressed that the Navy would “let me out of my career field so early.” As they were both majors and thus concerned about how every job they get will affect their career, it is starting to make sense to me why they thought I must be special to get to work with the Army, and that I was luck to be out here so young.
In 1987, the Nichols-Goldwater Defense Act instituted a requirement for “joint experience” to advance beyond a certain level. This really does make sense. You wouldn’t want the highest level decision makers in the Navy to understand only, for instance, the tactical employment of submarines. So the Department of Defense instituted two phases of Joint Military Professional Education (JPME I and II) that you should complete by the time you make O-5 and O-6, and as a requirement to make flag rank you have to serve in a joint billet. These billets have been traditionally difficult to get assigned to early in your career because more senior people need them to advance and when you’re a young submariner you should be learning the tactical employment of submarines instead of how to lead infantry. Billets that were designated as joint also tended to be broader in scope, not focused on the day to day employment of troops but on, for instance, the employment of large portions of the Army and how it fit together with the Navy in the grand scheme of making war. Again, this all fits with the idea that Nichols and Goldwater had in mind. As an example of a joint command, the Strategic Command in Omaha has about equal numbers of Air Force and Navy personnel since we both have strategic nuclear weapons. There are also some Army and Marines thrown in, I’m sure. The commander of StratCom used to switch between a Navy admiral and an Air Force general, but the last commander was actually a Marine. Going there was my second choice to teaching at USNA, but even if I had gone there I would not have gotten credit for serving my joint tour because I would have been in a job that was too narrow in scope to see how the Navy fit in with the big picture. There were only certain jobs that got the joint credit because they had a wide enough scope to see how the different services all contributed to the whole national strategic objective. It was a career hurdle that was a pain to get, but it really did make sense.
“So why can I so freely admit that something the military does make sense?” those who think I’m cynical may ask. Is it really me writing? I can say that the Goldwater-Nichols joint service requirement makes sense because they completely changed it this year. Like anything involving government that was not broken, after twenty years of good service we must find a way to break it. The old requirement for joint service did not “capture the broad experiences that many officers were having while conducting the global war on terror.” Something that sounds that well thought out usually precedes a strike by what is known as the “good idea fairy.” The good idea fairy that human tendency which causes people to make changes to a system that is working fine based on no relevant experience. For some reason congress changed Goldwater-Nichols so that there is now a point system which weights your experience and gives a certain credit to different experiences. The result is that I am getting joint credit right now. Let me say that again for all of you more senior officers who struggled to get the right billet: I am getting joint credit. Furthermore, since my joint credit is in a warzone, I get three points a month whereas an O-4 in a previously joint billet would get only one point a month. This is supposedly good for my career, but it is utterly ridiculous.
Here is my “joint experience”: I have been rented out by the Navy to the Army to fill a job that involves turning wrenches and working on a box with three switches and a USB connection. My joint command is headed up by a bunch of guys who are not from a variety of services to reflect the true joint nature of our armed forces, but are all Army. I just happen to be a Navy guy who is stuck with the Army. What am I learning about the Army that will give me a broader understanding of how the services work together to accomplish the National Command Authority’s goals? The first thing I have learned is that the Army generals who invited me out here think that their people are so untrainable that they cannot learn to operate a box with three switches and a USB connection free of Navy supervision. I have learned that the Army thinks the Navy doesn’t contribute to national security because our deployments are not 15 months. I have learned that they whine like two year olds about 15 month deployments. I have learned that most members of the Army are completely entertained by the Navy rank of Seaman and can find hours of amusement making jokes about sailors of that rank. And what has the Army learned about the Navy? I don’t know for sure, but I would guess nothing since by their own generals’ admissions they are untrainable.
That may be a little harsh. I’m sure they’ve learned to resent the Navy, too. Afterall, we only deploy for six months to hop from liberty port to liberty port. They would probably also say something about the Navy not having a PT uniform. The whole point of this is that this is not at all professionally enhancing and it is a travesty that I get joint credit for it.